Editor’s Comments by Hans-Werner Sinn




Reply to Bindseil, Cour-Thimann and König
I am grateful for the comments of these authors and
would like to offer this very brief reply.
a) Non-necessity hypothesis
Timo Wollmershäuser and I have argued that the
ECB was right to provide generous refinancing credit
in 2008/2009, but was wrong to continue this policy
when the world economy recovered in the second half
of 2009, because the public international credit flow it
organized undermined the functioning of the capital
market. This does not mean that I am willing to
accept defaults by major banks. On the contrary, I
elaborated on this topic extensively in the last chapter
of my book Casino Capitalism (Oxford University
Press, 2010), which argues that insolvent banks need
to be recapitalized with public funds in exchange for
shares. My point is merely that it is not the ECB’s job
to act as a lender of last resort by endowing banks
with more equity capital by providing them with
cheap credit below market levels. This is a fiscal func-
tion that should be controlled by parliaments.
b) Fiscal character hypothesis
Target credits are purely fiscal as they neither imply
an increase in the stock of aggregate base money nor
a change in its international allocation. As such, they
should be controlled by parliaments. The smooth
operation of the payment system is essential, but it
does not required unlimited Target credits at below
market conditions, as shown by the US system. In the
United States Target credits have to be redeemed once
a year with marketable assets at market conditions.
One of the reasons for the explosion in Target credits
and capital flight within Europe is that the ECB is try-
ing to undercut market prices by offering credit at
rates below those required by the market. This policy
risks destroying the eurozone, as no system can sur-
vive the kind of capital flight we are currently experi-
encing within our currency area. 
c) Credit replacement hypothesis
I agree that the second part of the hypothesis is more
difficult to test, but our emphasis has always been on
the first part. My point has often been interpreted and
misunderstood as a credit squeeze. Any such interpre-
tation is absurd. The argument is simply that the
abundance of inflowing liquidity is crowding out refi-
nancing credit in Germany. I am glad that the authors
share this view. 
References to the second part of the hypothesis were
never meant to be much more than an accounting
statement. To understand this part, it is important to
realize that the Target credit virtually amounts to a
public rescue credit provided by Germany. I believe
that we are in agreement up to this point. So the whole
question boils down to whether or not such rescue
credit implies that less capital is available for other
internal investment in Germany or for foreign invest-
ment in third countries than would otherwise have
been the case. Views can differ on this point, depend-
ing on whether one argues in a world of neoclassical
resource constraints or in a Keynesian setting, where
the credit given to other countries to support their
consumption and investment generates itself through
multiplier processes. These two opposing views are
discussed in the June version of my working paper
with Timo Wollmershäuser. 
d) Recommendation to limit T2 positions
Here I strongly disagree. The US system reallocates
the ownership shares in a common portfolio of assets,
as well as the interest income generated by that port-
folio. This implies that the Target-like credit can only
be drawn at market conditions and thus loses its
attraction. The capital flight measured by the Target
balances would not occur if the refinancing credit
were not available at conditions that undercut market
conditions. I fail to see where the institutional descrip-
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have given. This is the most important point. If we
mimic the United States, the capital flight will come to
an end.
e) Risk hypothesis
This seems to be a misunderstanding. The authors
write: “according to Sinn (2011b), risks related to
Target2 liabilities to the GIPS countries do not
account for the source of risk related to the central
bank credits in the context of the normal refinancing
operations”. This quote stemming from a short re  -
mark in previous article I wrote for the Süddeutsche
Zeitung is not meant to imply that the Target credit
does not result from a refinancing credit, but from a
refinancing credit that goes beyond the provision of
money balances for national transactions purposes.
The Target positions mean that money has been seep-
ing away to other states in net terms because a greater
amount of refinancing credit than normal has been
provided. This poses an extra risk to the community
of states, should the national central bank and its col-
lateral default. It even poses an additional risk to the
Bundesbank, which is the main accumulator of
Target claims, if the euro falls apart, because the
Bundesbank will then have a claim against a system
that no longer exists. (I am not aware, by the way, that
the Bundesbank ever objected to the risk interpreta-
tion I have given. It argued against a phantom posi-
tion that I never took, and did not even claim that I
took it. So I do not understand this remark.)
f) ‘Five-minutes to midnight’ hypothesis
This hypothesis was not meant to signify the end of
the world, but refers to a situation whereby German
net refinancing credit would be eliminated and where-
by the Bundesbank would be forced to become a net
borrower of the banking system to sterilize the
inflowing money created in the periphery. The
authors try to counter the argument made in my June
CESifo working paper with Timo Wollmershäuser by
pointing out that the ECB could easily perform this
sterilization by, for example, issuing debt certificates
and collecting time deposits. Yes, of course, but that is
our argument! Otherwise, I agree that defining the ter-
ritory in which the ECB will operate once total net
refinancing credit in the periphery has become nega-
tive, as it has indeed (compare Figure 1 in my intro-
ductory statement), is a difficult task and I welcome
the fact that the authors have offered a formal model
capturing this. We need more discussion of this model
than I can provide in this short reply. Kohler, as well
as Tornell and Westermann, also speculate on what
this could mean for the viability of the eurozone. They
are less optimistic. 
Reply to Ulbrich and Lipponer
These authors misrepresent the working paper by
Timo Wollmershäuser and myself when they claim
that we argue that gold and foreign exchange reserves
are necessary to absorb the excess liquidity seeping in
from countries relying heavily on refinancing credit.
They forget to mention that we also argue that the
extra liquidity can be re-absorbed from the banking
system via the Bundesbank’s borrowing funds. 
The authors also misrepresent the current account
problem, although without citing us explicitly. A cur-
rent account deficit needs to be financed either by an
ordinary capital import or by refinancing credit and
money creation (Target). I am more than surprised to
read this statement: “a direct financing of current
account deficits by the central banks has not occurred
and will not take place in the future”. Unless the
authors want to hide behind the word ‘direct’ this is
utterly wrong. It is a matter of fact that the ECB
financed nearly the entire current account deficit of
Greece in the years 2008–2010 by allowing the Greek
central bank to create and lend out the necessary
money. Greece’s current account deficit for this period
was 83.6 billion euros and its Target liability increased
by 76.2 billion euros or 91 percent. Logically, this
implies that only the remainder, 7.4 billion euros or
9 percent was financed by other net capital imports
(private capital and public rescue funds). 